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CHALENGES FACED BY EU SMEs IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS  
 





SMEs play a vital role in economic development. They offer the most economical use of capital 
in relation to job creation and provide the strongest growth channel for regional development. They 
are also recognized as the vehicle for growth in today’s regionally and globally interdependent and 
competitive economy. 
With a view at the global economic slowdown, it became apparent that economies in all regions 
of the world have significantly lost momentum which also affected SMEs.  
This paper present the main difficulties faced by SME in the EU region on the context of the 
present global crisis and deliver some recommendation about the reaction governments should take in 
order to avoid a major crisis in this important economic sector. 
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The national responses and other publicly available information provide some 
indications about the effective and expected movements in levels of sales of SMEs. 
SMEs in most countries report a clear demand downturn, if not a demand slump, 
in Q4 2008 and Q1 2009 and expect a further worsening to come. The magnitude 
of the reported shock is severe, but it differs from country to country, in part due 
to the differences in methods of assessment in each country. 
Evidence suggests that the experienced and expected fall in sales is having a 
strong  impact  on  SMEs.  This  is  further  supported  by  two  additional  stress 
indicators:  
(a)  increased  payment  delays  on  receivables  which  add  –together  with  an 
increase in inventories   to an endemic shortage of SMEs’ working capital and a 
decrease in liquidity  
(b) an increase in reported defaults, insolvencies, and bankruptcies. 
 
The economic indicators of the SME crisis 
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Extended  payment  delays  on  receivables,  especially  in  times  of  reduced 
sales,  rapidly  leads  to  a  depletion  of  working  capital  and  may  entail  frequent 
liquidity or even insolvency problems. Governments are aware that if SMEs cannot 
quickly obtain additional funding this will lead to insolvencies. 
According  to  “Insolvencies  in  Europe  2008/09”  (Creditreform),  the  total 
number of insolvencies increased by 11 percent between 2007 and 2008. In some 
countries like Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Norway, and Spain the surge in corporate 
insolvencies was higher than 25 percent when in other countries it remained stable 
between  2007  and  2008.  These  trends  have  to  be  interpreted  with  great  caution 
because legislation on insolvency and bankruptcies differs greatly by country, and so 
do  statistical  reporting  methodologies  –  which  means  that  the  figures  may  not 
capture short term changes. In order to have a proper reading of such figures, they 
should be put in longer term perspective.  
The response of the surviving SMEs to the double pressure of falling 
sales and extended payment delays in a general context of bleak medium terms 
perspectives is   in theory   three fold:  
(a)  cost cutting to restore profitability and adjustment of production to lower 
demand levels, measures that materialize mainly in a reduced wage bill;  
(b) search for additional sources of liquidity (extending own payment delays, 
reducing or suppressing dividends   if any);  
(c)  postponing  of  investment  and  expansion  plans, when  possible  (including 
M&A  activity  for  the  small  subset  of  high   growth  SMEs).  In  case  of 
entrepreneurship,  this  could  simply  mean  the  postponement  or  even  the 
cancellation of new business ventures. 
Among  the  possible  SME  responses  to  the  demand  shock  for  goods  and 
services, cost cutting and lay offs and the subsequent labor market impacts are some 
options.  
 
SME and credit availability in the new context 
 
In October and November 2008 extensive surveys have been undertaken as well 
in industrialized and in less developed Countries on the impact of the financial crisis 
on credit policy by lending banks and the wider impact on the near future of SME 
business, exports, investments and development. 
As  a  general  result  of  such  surveys  approximately  one  third  of  the  SME 
entrepreneurs  briefed,  stated  that  they  are  currently  experiencing  a  tightening  of 
credit policy by their banks (extreme restrictions have been decided e.g. in Iceland 
and in Central and East European Countries) and two third expect that in the short 
and medium term it will be more difficult to obtain credit – at least at economically 
acceptable conditions – for their business. 
The assessment of credit demand is difficult from the methodological point of 
view. Some countries use the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) method to capture changes Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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in demand as perceived by bank officials. These responses are weighted according to 
the  relevant  bank’s  market  share  and  presented  as  a  balance  of  opinions:  the 
weighted percentage that sees an increase in demand minus the weighted percentage 
that  see  a  decrease  in  demand.  The  evidence  from  countries  applying  this 
methodology clearly shows: 
(a) the overall slump in credit demand is being experienced in all countries but 
one in Q4 2008 and is expected to last in Q1 2009 even if its severity varies from 
country to country;  
(b) in all countries the reduction of credit demand for investment or acquisition 
purposes is extremely severe (50% or more of respondents);  
(c) SMEs’ demand for credit in Italy, and to a lesser extent Germany, did not 
change so dramatically when compared to their French, British and US counterparts. 
In  countries  either  not  using  or  not  publishing  BLS  results,  the  evidence 
provided refers to the many SMEs that feel frustrated in accessing credit and not to 
changes in the level of demand as such: in the Netherlands, one out of five SMEs 
was looking for additional funding in 2008. In contrast, in Finland less than 10 
percent of SMEs were  facing major difficulties in obtaining working capital or 
investment funding. 
The overall SME reactions that emerge from the available information suggest 
that entrepreneurs are not willing to increase their indebtedness despite the fact that 
sales fall and payment delays increase. Facing an uncertain future, this reaction is fully 
rational  especially  when  these  enterprises  are  confronted  with  tightened  credit 
conditions imposed by banks and other creditors. 
Loan conditions encompass many dimensions among which the most important 
are the spread between the banks and other financial intermediaries’ cost of funds 
and interests levels, the commissions, the difference between the amounts granted 
and those demanded by the enterprises, the level of collateral required, the duration of 
the loans, and processing delays.  
Figure  1  shows  changes  in  banks’  lending  conditions  derived  from  the  BLS 
methodology for both the euro area and the US. It reveals that except for euro area 
lending to corporations, the present tightening in bank loan conditions does not have 
any recent precedent. 









Indications from all countries converge and show a general tightening of credit 
conditions. Reductions in credit actually granted as compared to previous periods are 
visible for Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Belgium. 
The above mentioned evidence suggests that: 
(1)  SMEs  (and  enterprises  in  general)  have  strongly  reduced  their  investment 
projects financed by credit; 
 (2) SMEs demand for working capital and short term loans has been reduced in 
some countries but not as dramatically as for investment purposes;  
(3) banks have tightened their lending policies in terms of guarantees and 
amounts, but not exclusively towards SMEs;  
(4) in some countries banks and other financial intermediaries have substantially 
increased  the  cost  (and  spread)  of  credit  to  all  their  clients,  which  may  appear 
paradoxical in a situation of a general fall in interest rates. 
In consequence, this evidence suggests that in addition to the demand shock 
described above, conditions under which SMEs can access credit have significantly 
worsened in some reporting countries. If this is true, then the enterprises in general 
and SMEs in particular are, de facto, exposed to two different shocks reinforcing 
Source: EcoWi n, in “Danmarks National Bank”, Monetary Review, 4
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each other: a demand slump or downturn and a financial shock due to banks and 
other financial intermediaries’ reluctance to lend. 
Three  factors  may  have  exacerbated  the  banks  and  other  financial 
intermediaries’ attitude towards lending to SMEs: 
(a) poor SME economic prospects  
(b) the stagnation in inter bank lending and the increased cost of capital and 
(c) balance sheet constraints. 
 
In  all  EU  countries,  banks  and  other  financial  intermediaries  are  under 
pressure and are trying to preserve or strengthen their capital base. As part of this 
strategy they are seeking fully collateralized transactions that minimize the use of their 
economic (as opposed to regulatory) capital. In consequence, by choosing to keep only 
the strongest among their existing clients, banks and other financial intermediaries 
are contributing to a polarization process. In some countries, banks have reduced 
lending not just because risk has gone up, but also because they are having difficulty 
raising funds overseas and are directly affected by the substantially reduced access to 
short term inter bank funding at other than very expensive rates resulting from a 
significant deterioration in banks’ confidence in the banking sector’s general level of 
solvency and credit rating.  
The stagnation in lending is true even of banks in countries where governments 
have  deliberately  strengthened  banks’  balance  sheets  to  allow  them  to  grant 
additional  credit  to  SMEs  and/or  where  credit  guarantee  schemes  exist.  Most 
countries have not only recapitalized their banks but also extended the funds and 
guarantees available for SME financing. But the effects of the incentives to lend to 
SMEs  put  in  place  by  governments  in  some  countries (such  as  the  provision  of 
additional capital) have not yet yielded the desired results.  
Some governments are closely monitoring this situation or have put in place 
“credit mediators” to ease the flow of credit to SMEs.  
 
Alternative sources of financing 
 
Confronted  with  worsening  access  to  credit,  SMEs  are  exploring  alternative 
sources  of  finance  such  as  mobilization  of  reserves  and  self financing;  self 
financing and factoring. Although private equity and venture capital markets have 
not contributed to the global financial crisis, the extent of the impact the crisis has 
and will have on entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial firms and SMEs access to equity 
financing around the world remains unknown. 
In  terms  of  venture  capital  and  private  equity,  the  information  provided  is 
largely anecdotal and for many countries there are no official statistical data available 
covering 2008. However, new anecdotal information indicates that entrepreneurs, 
entrepreneurial firms and SMEs find it increasingly difficult to access financing for 




The  financial  crisis  has  had  a  three     fold  impact  on  venture  capital  and 
private equity markets:  
1. exit opportunities are reduced.  
2. fundraising activities seem to be shrinking.  
3. invested capital has stagnated or even slowly started to decline, especially 
investments in new projects.  
It is expected that invested capital will see further declines in the coming period. 
The  global  fundraising  activity  has  also  slowed  down  between  2007 2008.  The 
current economic situation and the global downward pressure on prices are expected 
to influence the future prospects for fundraising in the markets in the long run. 
Institutional investors providing funding will simply be less willing to supply new 
funds with fresh capital. As a result, the number of new venture capital funds could 
be lower than expected before the crisis. 
If the private venture capital and private equity funds do not raise sufficient 
capital,  they will  have  to  reduce  the  number  of  investment  managers.  For  many 
markets this will mean a significant setback in investment and have a negative impact 
on the development of investment expertise in the markets, and thus make it even 
harder for entrepreneurial firms and SMEs to survive and grow – in the longer run 
as well. 
Under  the  influence  of  these  trends,  public  funds  (both  direct  and  indirect 
investment funds) will be impacted as much as the private funds, if not more. In 
markets with  public  or  semi     public  investment funds, which  provide  capital  to 
funds of funds  activities,  such  public  funds  are  likely  to  witness  a  more  limited 
possibility for co investment with private funds, simply because the private funds 
increasingly reduce their investment activities. As a result, public funds cannot be 
expected to provide the same leverage effect as before the crisis, unless supplied 
with more capital. 
 
Policy responses of governments 
 
Countries’ abilities to deal with the crisis depend to a large extent on the margin 
provided  by  their  respective  fiscal  and  monetary  policies.  Many  of  the  reporting 
countries  have  recently  put  in  place  anti crisis  packages  combining  in  different 
proportions  three  lines  of  action:  stimulation  of  demand  (consumption  packages, 
infrastructure  programmes,  tax  policies);  credit  enhancement  measures,  including 
recapitalization  of  banks  which,  in  some  cases,  include  explicit  provisions  or 
mechanisms  to  preserve  or  enhance  banks’  capacity  for  financing  SMEs  such  as 
public  credit  guarantees;  and  labor market  measures  (reduced  employment  taxes  or 
social security charges and extended temporary unemployment programs).  
The anti crisis packages and accompanying measures address, in many countries, 
more  specifically  the  financing  problem  of  SMEs. The  measures  put  in place  by 
countries can be classified in three different groups depending on the aspect of the Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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SME financing problem to which they are geared. Three main groups of measures 
can be distinguished:  
(a) measures supporting sales, cash flows, and working capital;  
(b) measures to enhance SMEs access to liquidity, mainly to bank lending;  
(c)  measures  aimed  at  helping  SMEs  to  maintain  their  investment  level  and 
more generally their capacity to respond in the near future to a possible surge in 
demand.  
Despite the fact that in many of the responses, some of the largest banks have 
been recapitalized with public funds, the evidence from the economy suggest that 
banks have significantly tightened their credit policy. In order to alleviate the effects 
on SMEs of the twin shock of falling sales and more difficult access to funding, 
governments are using two different approaches to increase availability of credit:  
(a) on the incentive side, the creation and extension of guarantee schemes for 
loans to SMEs, or direct public lending;  
(b)  on  the  discipline  or  sanction  side,  providing  banks  that  have  been 
recapitalised by public monies with specific targets concerning SMEs lending, putting 
them  under  administrative  monitoring  or  putting  in  place  specific  procedures  to 
solve problems between individual SMEs and banks. 
 
Incentives: the loan guarantee schemes 
 
Extension, diversification of public guarantee schemes or, in some cases, even 
direct  lending  by  public  institutions,  are  among  measures  being  widely  used  by 
reporting countries. These policy measures aim at dealing with one of the key reasons 
that may explain banks reluctance to lend to SMEs that is, their constraint in terms of 
their capital requirements. Public guarantee schemes for SME credit are expected to 
be an incentive for bank lending to this segment of clients. For European Union 
member countries, the potential leverage effect of public guarantees on SME bank 
lending has been further extended by the decision of the European Commission to 
temporarily authorize Member States to ease access to finance for companies through 
subsidized guarantees and loan subsidies for investments. Almost all EU countries 
have enhanced, or put in place, a credit guarantee scheme either focused on SMEs or a 
general one.  
In some countries, the governments have found the response of the newly 
recapitalized  banks  to  the  needs  of  SMEs  unsatisfactory  or  insufficient.  These 
countries have resorted to discipline measures that in some cases complement the 
incentives, in order to pressure banks to continue lending to enterprises. Belgium and 
France have appointed a credit mediator, who at regional and central levels, may 
intervene to soften and help solve divergences between enterprises that are seeking 
bank funding and banks.  




Strengthening pro investment measures 
 
In the context of bleak medium term prospects amid falling sales, many SMEs 
have reduced or withheld their investment plans. In consequence, their demand 
for  long  term  lending  has  significantly  fallen.  In  order  to  prevent  SMEs  from 
losing their competitive edge in the medium term, and help them to remain ready 
for the upturn, some governments have put into place measures to strengthen their 
capital base or to develop their productive capacities, or both. These measures are 
mostly  provision  of  specific  funding  possibilities  such  as  grants  (Germany)  or 
credit (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Spain). On the top of this, the 
existence  of  Structural  Funds  within  the  European  Union  gives  to  new member 
countries a margin of manoeuvre to support SMEs investment projects in specific 
technologies, sectors or regions (Romania and the Czech Republic).  
 
Strengthening the capital base, private equity and venture capital 
 
Most of the measures described in this paper are very recent and thus have not 
been evaluated, in consequence  it is  impossible to identify  best  practices. This 
being  said,  extension  of  existing  credit  guarantee  schemes  is  the  most  widely 
adopted measure. It has to be stressed that these measures help SMEs by solving 
their immediate liquidity problem, but if the macroeconomic situation continues to 
worsen, they may only postpone an insolvency problem. In some countries, measures 
aimed at solving the long term problem of insufficient own capital base are being 
taken.  They  address  the  issue  either  by  helping  enterprises  to  strengthen  their 
cash flow and self financing or by putting in place additional sources of equity 
capital. 
Table 1: Policy responses in EU countries 
A. Measures supporting sales, 
cashflows and 
working capital (Annex 5) 
B. Enhancing SME 
access to liquidity, 
especially to bank 





















































Austria  •        •    •  • 





•        •    •   
Denmark  •    •          • 
Finland          •      • 
France    • •  •  •  Mediator  •   
Germany  •        •    •   
Greece          •       
Hungary          •    •  • 
Italy  •  • •    • 
Monitoring 
•   
Luxembourg •        •       
Netherlands •  • •  •  •       
Spain 
 
•        •    •   
UK      •  •      • 
Estonia        •       
Romania        •       
Slovenia •      •      • 
 
Source: OECD survey Nov.2008 
 
Conclusion 
Clearly,  SMEs  experience  additional  difficulties  today  in  achieving  adequate 
levels of liquidity, but it is still unclear to what extent they are willing to borrow, on 
what  terms  and  to  what  extent  they  are  credit  constrained.  Indeed,  increased 
borrowing today may result – in case of prolonged poor sales   in over indebtedness 
tomorrow. In such a situation the current liquidity problem would be transformed in 
the medium term into an insolvency one.  
Obviously, the banks’ attitude towards lending is an important component of 
the issues addressed in this paper. Compelled to revise their business models and 
lines of activities, most banks are constrained by their poor capital base and sensitive 
to the fact that investors are putting a premium on the shares of financial institutions 




In the new situation, some governments have had insufficient time and, in most 
cases, insufficient information, to base their interventions and measures on a solid 
diagnosis of the problems that SMEs – in their extreme heterogeneity of size, form 
and mode of operation – are facing. This being said, other governments, regardless 
of  the  incomplete  evidence  gathered  on  SMEs’  financial  difficulties,  felt that  the 
extraordinary circumstances required tailored responses, and they have adopted a 
number of measures to ease SMEs’ financing conditions.  
 The most widely used measure has been until now the extension of loans and 
loan guarantees. These measures are also very heterogeneous in their modalities, in 
their cost and also target groups. Time is too short to draw conclusions about what 
are the “best practices” in the field of emergency measures and in the field of loan 
guarantees.  
In  terms  of  venture  capital  and  private  equity  markets,  worsened  exit 
opportunities  and  declining  fundraising  activities  are  slowly  resulting  in  lower 
investment levels. It is expected that investment levels – in particular new investment 
– will decline further in the coming period. In terms of policy interventions on the 
venture  capital  markets,  it  is  uncertain  whether  the  newly  introduced  policy 
instruments have been designed following the crisis or planned prior to crisis and 
since adapted to the new situation.  
From  the  analysis  of  the  data  on  the  situation  of  SMEs  and  entrepreneurs 
regarding access to finance and the accompanying policy responses we consider the 
following recommendations: 
 
Improving cash flow 
·  Governments  could  consider  improving  SME  cash  flow  and  working 
capital through such measures as accelerated depreciation, tax measures, factoring 
for receivables and improved methods for reducing payment delays. For example, 
some governments have cut their payment delays to ten days. 
·  While SME liquidity can be increased through lending and fiscal measures, 
ultimately  it  is  the  revival  of  demand  that  will  sustain  SMEs.  Therefore, 
Governments  could  design  their  stimulus  packages  to  ensure  that  they  will  have 
more direct and timely impacts on SMEs. 
·  Public procurement should be considered more systematically as a demand 
side instrument to support R&D and production of innovative goods and services by 
contracting out to SMEs (in particular in the environmental, energy and IT areas). 
Facilitating access to credit 
·  While  guarantee  programmes  are  a  commonly  used  measure  by 
governments, there appears to be a problem in their uptake by banks. Governments 
could consider making their guarantee programmes more attractive through more 
appropriate risk sharing with private lenders. 
·  To ease the access to bank lending, particularly for SMEs, Governments 
could keep under review the role of credit mediators and monitoring and adopt such 
mechanisms if appropriate. Any revisions in Basel 2 should also be reviewed for Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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their impacts on SME lending 
Fostering investment 
·  Due  to  worsened  exit  markets  and  declining  fundraising  activities, 
Governments could consider policy instruments aimed at improving exit markets 
and enhancing the supply of venture capital. 
·  Public  equity  funds  can  operate  so  as  to  help  catalyze  and  leverage  the 
provision of private risk capital. Governments and international organizations could 
establish or increase public equity funds to leverage private risk capital to prevent 
the complete collapse of new venture capital and its consequences for start ups and 
innovative SMEs. 
Promoting business services and SME engagement in the design of relevant policies 
·  To  help  SMEs  confront  the  current  financial  and  economic  crises, 
Governments  could  improve  their  provision  of  information  on  SME related 
government measures to business service providers or business associations. They 
could also facilitate the provision of business services to SMEs to assist them in their 
negotiations with banks and other financial intermediaries and in resolving their cash 
flow problems. 
·  In times of crisis, the managerial competencies of SMEs – especially in the 
field of finance –have to be supported. In order to improve the level of financial 
knowledge  of  SMEs,  Governments  could  support,  in  the  short term,  business 
development services and training programmes. 
·  SMEs should be engaged in the design of relevant policies from the outset, to 
ensure that their perspectives and needs are well understood and taken into account. 
Governments could communicate and consult regularly with the representatives of 
SMEs to assess both the extent of the impact of the crisis and the effectiveness of 
existing measures and programmes in helping SMEs survive. 
Promoting the availability and diffusion of timely information 
· There is a need for more timely and SME specific data on financing. The bank 
lending survey methodology appears as a possible best practice, especially if it could 
be  extended  to  cover  all  other  financing  sources  available  to  SMEs. 
Governments  could  also  consider  improving  transparency  in  bank  lending  by 
encouraging the timely public disclosure by banks of the composition of their loan 
portfolios by size of firm. 
· In order to be in a position to better distinguish – in times of crisis as today   
what  problems  are  extra ordinary  (i.e.  linked  to  the  present  crisis)  and,  in 
consequence, could possibly be addressed by extra ordinary measures, and what are 
the usual ones to be left to “usual” measures, Governments could put in place a policy 
oriented “SME Financing SCOREBOARD” based on different observation methods 
so  as  to  obtain  a  comprehensive  real time  picture  that  would  also  capture  early 
warning signals. In order to support and nourish the “SME Financing Scoreboard”, 
Governments  could  develop  a  set  of  sophisticated  observation  methods  such  as 
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